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SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE AND
DUE PROCESS FOR THE POOR MAN -
FANTASY OR REALITY - RICHARDSON v. BELCHER
By SAMUEL J. SMITH*
Richardson v. Belcher bars the extension of the developing
fundamental rights doctrine from encompassing social security
disability insurance benefits. The motivation for Mr. Smith's
critical evaluation of the Supreme Court's decision derives from
his experience in social security law and his representation in
social security disability insurance claims of coal miners and
other low income families in West Virginia -people of the sort
who will feel more directly the impact of Belcher. What fol-
lows is a uniquely practical and personal analysis of a decision
of broad implication.
INTRODUCTION
AYMOND Belcher was a 53-year-old southern West Vir-
gina coal miner, married, with two children. He was an
employee of the Pccahontas Fuel Co. at Lynco, West Virginia,
where his yearly earnings totaled approximately $6,600.' On
March 25, 1968, Belcher received a broken neck during the
course of his duties as an employee of Pocahontas. On May 20,
1968, Belcher filed an application for social security disability
benefits, 2 alleging that he became unable to work as a result
of the above-mentioned accident. His wife and children also
applied for benefits under the Act. Belcher, his wife and chil-
dren were granted social security disability benefits effective
in October 1968, in the sum of $329.70 per month. Further-
more, since his employer had chosen to establish a workmen's
compensation fund, Belcher lecame entitled to workmen's com-
pensation from the State of West Virginia in the sum of
$203.60 per month.
In January 1969, Belcher's monthly social security dis-
* Associate, Hindry & Meyer, P.C., Denver, Colorado; A.B., Marshall
University, 1958; J.D., Washington and Lee University, 1964.
1 Facts in personal knowledge of writer, as well as facts contained in
Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (S.D.W. Va. 1970)
and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
2 Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), codified
(with subsequent amendments) as 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970). Paral-
lel citations will be given in all subsequent footnotes, since the Act has
been codified in Title 42 of U.S.C., but that title of U.S.C. has not been
enacted into positive law. References in text are to Statutes at Large
denominations, which are in popular usage.
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ability payment was reduced from $329.70 per month to $225.30
under the reduction and offset provisions of section 2243 of the
Social Security Act upon a finding that Belcher was receiving
workmen's compensation from the State of West Virginia.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Belcher instituted
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, 4 challenging the offset and reduction
provision of section 224 as a denial of due process of law guar-
anteed by the fifth amendment.
The district court held for Belcher, granting the full social
security benefits and holding the reduction in benefits to be
unconstitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the holding
of the district court was reversed.5
I. DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
During recent years much has been written concerning
due process as it relates to a poor person charged with a crime.
However, comparatively little has been written concerning civil
due process as it relates to the poor man and social justice.
Furthermore, in connection with the poor man and other per-
sons comprising the lower income families classification, the
social security laws, their administration, and court interpreta-
tion have all but escaped the scrutiny and quills of judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars."
This article will briefly examine the nature and purpose
of the Social Security Act as it relates to the provision of dis-
ability benefits. An analysis of Richardson v. Belcher will fol-
low, with the object of identifying the problems with respect
to social security disability insurance benefits which the deci-
3 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 335, 79 Stat.
406, amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1970) (popularly known as a "Section 224
Reduction").
4 Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970). The Act
provides for review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare by the United States judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(g), 53 Stat. 1370, amending
Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 205, 49 Stat. 624 (1935), codified as 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
5 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), rev'g 317 F. Supp. 1294
(S.D.W. Va. 1970).
6 Social security disability benefits have been discussed in the following
articles: Abraham & Walkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the
Social Security Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1055
(1963); Myers, Disability Benefit Provisions Under the Social Security
Act--An Early Report, 16 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 5 (1952); Samuels,
Deduction for Benefits Received, 119 NEW L. J. 228 (1969); Sharp,
Social Security Disability Cases, 55 A.B.A.J. 141 (1969); Note, Social
Security Disability Benefits: Three Current Problems, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 165 (1967); 40 U. CiN. L. REV. 408 (1971).
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sion creates for the poor working man or woman who is injured
d'uring the course of employment and suffers permanent, total
disability.
A. General Provisions
Generally speaking, the Social Security Act encompasses
numerous programs which all appear to have the basic objec-
tives of keeping individuals and families from becoming desti-
tute due to loss of earnings, protecting the elderly against the
rising costs and expenses of illnesses that could otherwise
exhaust their savings, keeping families together, and hopefully
giving children the opportunity to grow up in health and




D. Hospital and medical insurance for the aged.
E. Unemployment insurance.
F. Public assistance and welfare services.
It should be noted that although the Social Security Act is a
federal law, the federal government operates only the retire-
ment, the survivors, the disability, and the hospital and medical
insurance programs listed above, while the unemployment and
public assistance and welfare programs are operated by the
states with federal cooperation.'
B. Disability Insurance Benefits
One of the purposes of the Social Security Act is to keep
families from becoming destitute due to loss of earnings by the
family bread winner in the event that he or she becomes dis-
abled. To that effect the Social Security Act provides a disabled
worker with monthly cash disability insurance benefits begin-
ning with the first month in which all the following conditions
have been met: 9
A. He or she is under a disability as defined in sections
216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act.'
7 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AD-
MINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 2 (4th ed. 1969).
s Id. at 3.
9 See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 103, 70 Stat. 815,
amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1) (1970).
")The term "disability" is defined in sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act, as amended, to mean:
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
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B. He or she has filed an application for disabled workers
benefits in accordance with section 223 (b) of the Social
Security Act. 1
C. He or she has the requisite disability insured status.
1 2
D. He or she has completed a 6-month waiting period or
he or she is exempted from this requirement.
1 3
E. He or she has not attained age 65.
Additional monthly benefits, commonly referred to as aux-
iliary benefits, are normally payable to the other family mem-
bers (husband or wife and children) on the earnings record of
the disabled worker.' 4 The amount of the monthly disability
payments which the disabled worker and his family receives
is based upon the amount of contributions which the worker
has made to the social security fund. Thus a worker whose
income averages approximately $6,500 per year and who makes
social security contributions on that amount would receive a
higher monthly disability payment than another worker whose
income might average approximately $4,500 per year.
C. Section 224 Reduction
The disabled worker, however, may not be entitled to the
full amount of monthly cash disability benefits described above
if he is also receiving monthly benefits pursuant to a federal
impairment which can be expected to result in death or has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months ....
The 1968 amendments of the Act imposed the additional require-
ment that
(A) an individual . . . shall be determined to be under dis-
ability only if his physical or mental impairment or impair-
ments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gain-
ful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b), 81 Stat. 868, amend-
ing Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970).
11 Section 223(b) of the Social Security Act provides for the filing of
an application, which is a prerequisite for obtaining social security
disability benefits.
12 Section 223(c) of the Social Security Act defines insured status, which
for most means that he or she must have not less than 20 quarters of
coverage during the 40-quarter period which ends with a quarter in
which a person becomes disabled.
13 Section 223 (c) (2) of the Social Security Act provides that a disabled
person must wait a period of 6 months after onset of the disability
before monthly benefits can be paid.
14 Section 202 of the Social Security Act provides auxiliary benefits for
the wife and children of a disabled worker.
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or state workmen's compensation law or plan. Section 224 of
the Social Security Act provides, in part:
(a) If for any month prior to the month in which an individ-
ual attains the age of 62 -
(1) such individual is entitled to benefits under section
223 of this title, and
(2) such individual is entitled for such month, under a
workmen's compensation law or plan of the United States
or a State, to periodic benefits for a total or partial dis-
ability (whether or not permanent), and the Secretary
has, in a prior month, received notice of such entitlement
for such month,
the total of his benefits under section 223 of this title for such
month and of any benefits under section 202 of this title for
such month based on his wages and self-employment income
shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount by
which the sum of -
(3) such total of benefits under sections 223 and 202 of
this title for such month, and
(4) such periodic benefits payable (and actually paid)
for such month to such individual under the workmen's
compensation law or plan,
exceeds the higher of -
(5) 80 percentum of his 'average earnings,' or
(6) the total of such individual's disability insurance
benefits under section 223 of this title for such month and
and of any monthly insurance benefits under section 202
of this title for such month based on his wages and self-
employment income, prior to reduction under this section.
In no case shall the reduction in the total of such benefits
under sections 223 and 202 of this title for a month (in a con-
tinuous period of months) reduce such total below the sum
of -
(7) the total of the benefits under sections 223 and 202
of this title, after reduction under this section, with respect
to all persons entitled to benefits on the basis of such
individual's wages and self-employment income for such
month which were determined for such individual and
such persons for the first month for which reduction
under this section was made (or which would have been
so determined if all of them had been so entitled in such
first month), and
(8) any increase in such benefits with respect to such
individual and such persons, before reduction under this
section, which is made effective for months after the first
month for which reduction under this section is made.
15
The final effect of such reduction may be a total or partial
loss of social security disability benefits. At first glance there
does not appear to be anything contained in section 224 which
15 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 335, 79 Stat.
406, amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620
(1935), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1970).
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seems unfair or unconscionable. However, further review and
study of the Social Security Act does not reflect other pro-
visions providing for a similar reduction in monthly social
security disability benefits where a disabled worker is receiving,
in addition to social security disability benefits, the following
federal or private benefits:
A. Civil Service Retirement Act.1"
B. Railroad Retirement Act Annuity.17
C. Veterans Administration Disability Benefits.1 8
D. Coverage under a private disability insurance policy.
E. Damages received in action in tort arising from the
disabling injury.
Thus, it becomes very clear that the offset or reduction
found in the disability insurance provisions of the Social Secur-
ity Act applies only to a federal social security recipient who is
also receiving workmen's compensation payments.19 Clearly,
section 224 singles out recipients of workmen's compensation
for the reduction and offset treatment. The question which
logically follows, then, is whether section 224 is not arbitrary
and does not lack a rational basis in that it discriminates be-
tween those disabled workers who receive workmen's com-
pensation and those who receive compensation from other
sources set out above. This is the question presented by the
plaintiff in Belcher.
II. Richardson v. Belcher
A. The District Court Opinion
In September 1970, United States District Judge Sidney
L. Christie 20 issued a memorandum decision 21 in which he
16 Employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act are entitled
to disability annuity after 5 years of civilian service. 5 U.S.C. § 8337
(1970). In fiscal 1970, there were 184,000 disabled annuitants. STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (1971). See also Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85 (1971).
17 The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 provides disability benefits for
railroad workers with 10 or more years of covered service. 45 U.S.C.
§ 228a (1970). See also 404 U.S. at 85-86 n.3.
18 The Veterans Administration provides disability benefits for service-
connected as well as nonservice-connected disabilities. In fiscal 1970,
over 2,000,000 veterans received service-connected disability benefits.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (1971). See also 404
U.S. at 85 n.1.
19 Concerning disability insurance benefits the only offset or reduction
provisions are contained in § 224 of the Social Security Act.
20The Honorable Sidney L. Christie has been a distinguished United
States federal district judge for both the northern and southern dis-
trict of West Virginia since his appointment in 1964. Judge Christie
has probably reviewed more social security disability cases than any
other active federal judge and was recently appointed to the chief
judgeship for southern West Virginia.
21 Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
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held that the facts and circumstances of Raymond Belcher's
case were such that the section 224 reduction could not be con-
stitutionally applied. To apply section 224, he reasoned, would
deprive Raymond Belcher of due process and equal protection
of the law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In
arriving at his conclusion, Judge Christie cited the Congres-
sional Record in its characterization of the nature of the Social
Security Act:
"Social Security is not a handout; it is not charity; it is not
relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and
earnings of the individual. As an earned right, the individual
is eligible to receive his benefit in dignity and self-respect."
22
The government sought to justify the discriminatory pro-
visions of the section 224 reduction by arguing that its purpose
was to avoid the duplication of public benefits. Judge Christie
rejected this argument on the grounds that the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Fund is supported solely by premi-
ums and other funds paid by employers and could not be
treated as a public benefit.
Judge Christie acknowledged Flemming v. Nestor,23 which
held that the old-age benefits of an alien deported for cause
could be lawfully terminated without offending the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. However, Judge Christie felt
that Raymond Belcher was not entitled to such cavalier treat-
ment, especially in view of the more recent case of Goldberg
v. Kelly 24 which in essence elevated the receipt of welfare
benefits to the equivalent of a property right, also entitled to
the safeguards of due process. Judge Christie concluded:
Therefore, since the Court in Goldberg appears to have de-
termined that entitlement to welfare is in the nature of a
property right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, by the same rationale it must be deter-
mined that one who has made direct contribution to the soocial
security fund and becomes entitled to disability benefits there-
under should and ought to be accorded equal status and pro-
tection. For it seems to us to be patently unfair for the wel-
fare recipient, under Goldberg, to have a 'property right status'
with all the procedural safeguards of due process, while the
social security recipient, Under Nestor, is deprived of such
status and protection. The distinction is not only completely
illogical, but is grossly inequitable.
25
22 Id. at 1298, citing 102 CONG. REC. 15, 110 (1956) (emphasis added by
court).
23 Id. at 1297; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
24 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25 317 F. Supp. at 1297.
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B. The Supreme Court Opinion
On direct appeal,26 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed (4-3) the judgment entered by Judge Christie and up-
held the constitutionality of section 224 of the Social Security
Act.2
7
In an opinion that is more curious than compelling, Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that the clas-
sification contained in section 224 of the Social Security Act
was based upon legitimate purposes and goals established by
Congress that were "rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination."
28
In reaching his conclusion, Mr. Justice Stewart discussed
the legislative history which prompted Congress to enact sec-
tion 224 in its present form and found that certain data pre-
sented to congressional committees tended to show that in
approximately 70 percent of the states, a typical worker injured
during the course of his employment and eligible for both
social security disability benefits and state compensation re-
ceived combined benefits in excess of his normal take-home
pay immediately prior to his disability. Mr. Justice Stewart
further indicated, again relying on the same data, that this
situation reduced the incentive of workers to return to work.2 "
Mr. Justice Stewart all but ignored the "property theory"
espoused in Goldberg, but did indicate that the Goldberg ration-
ale was not applicable to Belcher. Instead, it was held that the
"rationally based and free from invidious discrimination"
rationale as set out in Dandridge v. Williams3 1 was the proper
test to apply in Belcher:
A statutory classification in the area of social welfare is
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it is "rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination." Dandridge v. Williams ..... .. While the
present case, involving as it does a federal statute, does not
directly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
28 The Judiciary Act of 1948 provides:
- Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an in-
terlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of
the United States . . .holding an Act of Congress unconstitu-
tional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the
United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee
thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1970).
27 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
28 Id. at 81.
29 Id. at 83.
30 397 U.S. 471 (1970). It should be noted that Dandridge involved an
interpretation by the Court of a statutory classification under the laws
of the State of Maryland. It now appears that the Dandridge doctrine
or test has been extended to statutory classifications under federal law.
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tion Clause, a classification which meets the test articulated
in Dandridge is perforce consistent with the due process re-
quirement of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 .... 31
Applying the Dandridge test to the legislative intent and
goals of Congress in establishing the section 224 reduction, Mr.
Justice Stewart concluded:
The original purpose of state workmen's compensation laws
was to satisfy a need inadequately met by private insurance or
tort claim awards. Congress could rationally conclude that this
need should continue to be met primarily by the States, and
that a federal program which began to duplicate the efforts of
the States might lead to the gradual weakening or atrophy of
of the state programs.
32
III. IMPLICATIONS OF Richardson v. Belcher
Dandridge involved an interpretation by the Supreme Court
of a statutory classification under the law of the State of Mary-
land. Since the Dandridge rationale has been applied to Belcher,
it seems clear that the Dandridge doctrine has been extended
to statutory classifications under federal law. Furthermore,
since the Court rejected the Goldberg "property theory" in
Belcher, the Court has in essence revitalized and given new life
to Flemming v. Nestor.
Another writer commenting on the district court decision
in Belcher suggests that the "property theory" espoused in
Goldberg could not be applied to Raymond Belcher since he "is
not a hard-core unemployable caught up in the cycle of pov-
erty." 3:1 It should be pointed out that the coal fields of southern
West Virginia, the area in which Raymond Belcher lives, is one
of the most improverished areas in the entire United States
and has been so judicially recognized." Raymond Belcher was
disabled due to a crippling coal mine injury, as opposed to a
person who is unemployed. Upon what rational theory or
basis can a disabled workingman's right to be subservient to
those of an unemployed person on welfare? Is it not illogical
that a welfare recipient who has made no direct contribution
to the fund from which he receives benefits has a recognizable
"property right" which is protected by all the due process safe-
guards and that Raymond Belcher, who has worked all his life
and made direct contributions to the social security fund from
:31 404 U.S. at 81.
32 Id. at 83-84.
3  See 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 414 (1971).
34 See Morton v. Gardner, 257 F. Supp. 67, 74 (S.D.W. Va. 1966).
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which he receives benefit, is without a "property right" suf-
ficient to grant him due process safeguards? Such treatment of
the workingman is simply not consistent with the due process
and equal protection guarantees afforded by the Constitution.
Considered in another light, it is clear that the majority
opinion in Belcher has accorded the Social Security Act the
traditional presumption of validity characteristic of the "old"
equal protection cases, and dropped in "new" equal protection
cases. 3 5 Mr. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by
Mr. Justice Brennan, responded to the majority opinion, which
applied the presumption, in two ways. First, he asserted that
the presumption of validity should not be applied:
In opposing this course, I adhere to my dissenting views
in Dandridge v. Williams. I continue to believe that the "ration-
al basis" test used by this Court in reviewing business regula-
tion has no place when the Court reviews legislation providing
fundamental services or distributing government funds to pro-
vide for basic human needs.
36
Assuming, arguendo, that the presumption of validity was ap-
plicable, Mr. Justice Marshall went on to point out that no
rational basis existed for the distinction:
[E]ven under the Court's "rational basis" test, the discrimina-
tory offset provision here cannot be sustained. There simply is
no reasonable basis for singling out recipients of workmen's
compensation for a reduction of federal benefits, while those
who receive other kinds of disability compensation are not
similarly treated.
37
The discrimination caused by section 224 is further clarified
by Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Belcher, wherein
he states:
Thus, had Belcher's supplemental disability payment come
from a Veteran's Administration program, a Civil Service Re-
tirement Act or Railroad Retirement Act Annuity, a private
35 Equal protection has traditionally been couched in terms of reasonable
classifications. A classification is not unreasonable if it is related to the
police power of the state. If the court can conceive of any set of facts
that would sustain the reasonableness of the classification, the burden
is on the party challenging the statute to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the classification is arbitrary and without reasonable
basis. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). In a
series of recent cases involving certain interests, however, the burden
of proof has been shifted. In cases involving "fundamental rights,"
the presumption of validity is not applied, the effect of which is to pre-
sume the invalidity of statutes adversely affecting a fundamental right.
In such a case, the burden is on the state to show reasonableness by
clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Kramer v. School District, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), right to vote; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), right to travel, or right to receive welfare, or both; Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), distinction based on race; Douglas V. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), right to counsel on appeal.
36 404 U.S. at 90.
3
7 Id. at 91.
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disability insurance policy, a self-insurer, a voluntary wage
contribution plan, or the proceeds in an action in tort arising
from the disabling injury, there would have been no reduction
in his social security benefits. The offset under § 224 applies
only to federal social security disability beneficiaries also re-
ceiving workmen's compensation payments, a group which in
1965 totaled only 1.4% of all social security disability benefici-
aries. Yet, of the 849,000 disabled workers who in 1965 re-
ceived social security disability benefits, over sixteen percent
also received overlapping veteran's benefits, and almost four-
teen percent received benefits from prviate insurance main-
tained under the auspices of an employer or a union.
3 8
In short, the presumption of validity applied in Belcher pre-
sents an obstacle which may well prove to be insurmountable,
and the due process safeguards as they relate to the acts of
Congress may well be a myth.39
CONCLUSION
One of the most astounding aspects of Belcher is the Court's
complete disregard of the fact that it was taking a substantial
amount of badly needed income from the Raymond Belcher
family. Mr. Justice Marshall makes this point very clear by
pointing out that Raymond Belcher was earning approximately
$6,600 per year prior to his disabling injury. Had Raymond
Belcher been able to keep the full measure of social security
benefits totalling $329.70 per month in addition to his workmen's
compensation benefits of $203.60 per month, his income would
have totalled almost $6,400 per year, some $200 less than he
had earned before his disabling injury.
4
1 Because of the section
224 reduction, however, Raymond Belcher's social security bene-
fits were reduced to $225.30 per month, the effect of which
was a reduction of his annual income to almost $5,100 per year,
a net loss of approximately $1,300 per year.
The full impact of the Belcher decision will be felt by the
lower income families who cannot afford to purchase disability
insurance to protect themselves from the sudden loss of income,
such as the Belcher family, which must now live on sub-
stantially less per year due directly to the section 224 offset.
38 Id. at 85-87.
39 In the area of economic regulation, the Supreme Court has typically
given a presumption of validity to state laws challenged as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note
35 supra. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), represents a rare, if not
solitary, instance in which the Court has recited the Williamson v. Lee
Optical language defining the application of the presumption, and then
gone on to find the statute discriminatory. Morey probably stands as a
warning to the legislature only that it should make an effort to avoid
discriminatory classifications so blatant as that in the Illinois statute
which Morey invalidated.
40 404 U.S. at 88.
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This decision affects the coal miners, farm hands, custodians,
sanitary removal personnel, laborers, and street cleaners, just
to mention a few. The effect of this decision will not be felt
by the blue collar worker who has more substantial financial
resources from which he can purchase disability insurance
which is not subject to the section 224 offset. But, this
decision will also be felt by the minority groups throughout
America, who comprise the majority of lower income families.
It seems grossly unfair that these people must suffer the pos-
sibility of further discrimination.
To the practical-minded federal district judges who are
being called upon with increased frequency to interpret the
social security laws, to the lawyer who is involved on a day-to-
day basis representing the poor workers having social security
disability claims, and to the poor disabled workers who look to
the social security and workmen's compensation laws for
assistance, to say that the section 224 offset of the Social Secur-
ity Act is not discriminatory and violative of the fifth amend-
ment is exalting fantasy over reality.
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